LSAT考试全真试题五SECTION4(3)

13. It can be inferred that the author of the passage regards Hart s theory of hard cases and the theory of standard law as

(A) exhaustive
(B) worthy¹ of respect
(C) interesting but impractical
(D) plausible² but unwieldy
(E) hopelessly outmoded

14. Which one of the following is true of the term "legally determinate" (line 6) as it is used in the passage?

(A) It represents the idea that every crime should have a fixed³ penalty rather 　　than a range of penalties within which a judge can make an arbitrary choice
(B) It refers to a legal case that can be definitively⁴ resolved in favor of one side 　　or the other according to the law in effect at the time
(C) It describes a legal rule that requires judges to limit their actions to applying 　　written law when deciding cases over which people with legal training 　　disagree
(D) It refers to any legal case that involves terms with imprecise meanings and 　　thus relies for its resolution only on the determination of judges.
(E) It refers to procedures for determining the legal outcome of complex issues 　　in difficult cases.

15. In the passage, the author is primarily concerned with

(A) outlining the problems that might be faced by a legislature attempting to 　　create a complete body of law that would prevent judges from making 　　rather than applying the law
(B) justifying⁵ the idea that "hard" cases will always exist in the practice of law, 　　no matter what laws are written or how they are applied
(C) presenting evidence to support Dworkin s idea that legal rules apply in an 　　all-or-nothing fashion whereas legal principles apply in more sophisticated 　　ways
(D) critiquing the concept of the open texture⁶ of legal terms as a conceptual 　　flaw in Hart s otherwise well-regarded book.
(E) demonstrating that Dworkin s concept of legal principles does not form the 　　basis for a successful attack on Hart s theory of legally indeterminate 　　cases

　　　One way governments can decrease air pollution is to impose a tax on 　industrial carbon dixide emissions⁸. But why should governments consider a 　carbon tax when they could control emissions by

(5) establishing energy efficiency and conservation standards, by legislating⁹ 　against coal use or by increasing inverstment in nuclear? The great virtue¹⁰ of 　such a tax is that it would provide incentives¹² for industry to achieve emission⁷

(10) reductions. Because oil emits more carbon dioxide per unit of energy 　generated than does natural gas, and coal more than oil,a carbon tax would 　vary with the type of fuel.Such a tax would induce industry to substitute less-　polluting fuels for those carrying a

(15) higher tax and also to reduce the total use of energy

　　　However it is not clear how high such a tax should be or what its 　economic and environmental implications would be. At first glance, it is not

(20) difficult to estimate roughly the size of the tax needed to effect a given level 　of emission reduction. One writer estimates for example that a tax of 41 　percent on the price of coal 33 percent on oil and 25 percent on gas would 　reduce the United

(25) Kingdom s emissions by 20 percent (using 1988 as the base year) by the 　year 2005 the target recommended by the 1988 Toronto Conference. It should 　be noted¹³ however that these numbers ignore the effect of the tax on 　economic growth, and

(30) hence on emissions, and assume that past responses to a price rise will 　be replicated¹⁴ in the future These numbers are also based on the assumption 　that all countries will behave cooperatively in imposing¹⁵ a carbon tax.

(35) There are very strong reasons to believe that cooperation would be difficult 　to win. If most countries cooperated. then any country that chose not to 　cooperate would be advantaged it would have no abatement¹⁶ costs, and the 　effect on the

(40) environment of its defection would be relatively¹⁷ small. Because of this "free 　rider" effect cooperation on a scale needed to reduce carbon dioxide 　emissions might prove elusive¹⁸

　　　Should countries act unilaterally to durb

(45) emissions? If a country were to act unilaterally the benefits would be 　spread across the globe, whereas the costs would fall solely¹⁹ on the country 　taking the action. The action would reduce emissions globally and the effect 　of this would be to reduce the benefit

(50) other countries would receive if they reduced emissions. As a 　consequence other countries would have less incentive¹¹ to reduce emissions 　and would probably emit more carbon dioxide than they would have if the 　unilateral action had not been taken

(55) The entire effect of the emission reduction may not be lost, but it would 　surely be dimminished by this free-riding behavior

16. According to the passage, the size of the carbon tax levied²⁰ on a given fuel would vary with the

(A) amount of that fuel used by a particular industry
(B) amount of pollution caused by the fuel being taxed
(C) size of the industries using the fuel being taxed
(D) effect that the tax would have on a country s economy
(E) number of usuers of a particular fuel at a particular time

17. The author mentions the estimates of "One writer" (line 22) primarily in order to

(A) indicate in a general way the size that a carbon tax must be for it to be 　　effective.
(B) provide the most accurate information available about the most practical 　　size for a carbon tax
(C) suggest that the target recommended by the 1988 Toronto Conference is an 　　unrealistic one
(D) undermine the argument that a carbon tax would provide incentives for 　　user s to achieve emissions reductions
(E) show how the size of an effective carbon tax can be calculated