(单词翻译:单击)
第十一篇
“Fat, dumb and happy,” commercial banks are being quickly replaced as financial intermediaries
(1) What would happen to the U.S. economy if all its commercial banks suddenly closed their doors? Throughout most of American history, the answer would have been a disaster of considerable proportions, akin1 to the Depression brought about by the chain-reaction bank failures in the early 1930s. But in 1993 the startling answer is that a shutdown by banks might be far from disastrous2.
(2) Consider this: though the economic recovery is now 27 months old, not a single net new dollar has been lent to business by banks in all that time. Last week the Federal Reserve reported that the amount of loans the nation’s largest banks have made to businesses fell an additional $2.4 billion in the week ending June 9, to $274.8 billion. Fearful that the scarcity3 of bank credit might undermine the fragile economy, the White House and federal agencies are working feverishly4 to encourage banks to open their lending windows. In the past two weeks, government regulators have introduced steps to make it easier for banks to lend. For instance, less pa-perwork will be needed to process loans, and formal appraisals5 are no longer required for every real estate loan.
(3) Is the government’s concern fully6 justified7? Who really needs banks these days? Hardly anyone, it turns out. While banks once dominated business lending, today nearly 80% of all such loans come from nonbank lenders like life insurers, brokerage firms and finance companies. Banks used to be the only source of money in town. Now businesses and individuals can write checks on their insurance companies, get a loan from a pension fund, and deposit paychecks in a money-market account with a brokerage firm. “It is possible for banks to die and still have a booming economy,” says Edward Furash, a Washington bank consultant8.
(4) The irony9 is that the accelerating slide into irrelevance10 comes just as the banks reaped record profits of $43 billion over the past 15 months, creating the impression that the industry is staging a comeback. But that income was not the result of smart lending decisions. Instead of earning money by financing America’s recovery, the banks mainly invested their funds — on which they were paying a bargain-basement 2% or so — in risk-free Treasury11 bonds that ______ 7%. That left bank officers with little to do except put their feet on their desks and watch the interest roll in.
(5) Those profits may have come at a price. Not only did bankers lose many loyal customers by withholding12 credit, they also accidentally opened the door to a herd13 of nonbank competitors, who swarmed14 into the lending market. “The banking15 industry didn’t see this threat,” says Furash. “They are being fat, dumb and happy. They didn’t realize that banking is essential to a modern economy, but banks are not.”
(6) The soft economy has often been used by banks as an excuse for the slowdown in extending credit. Yet evidence abounds16 that banks are still gun-shy` about lending to business. And no wonder. More than $125 bil-lion in failed loans to real estate buyers, developing countries, farmers and the energy industry have had to be written off in the past five years.
(7) The invasion of other financial companies eager to make loans has caused deep damage to the banking industry. “The banks are clearly losing the franchise` of lending to business,” says David Wyss, senior financial economist17 for DRI/McGraw-Hill, a large economic consulting firm. “That should be scaring them because this is where their real profits are.”
(8) Though banks lost most of their blue-chip corporate18 clients years ago to Wall Street’s capital markets, they still retained another profitable part of banking: the small and mid-size business borrower. But that has changed in the past few years. The spread of computer technology and sophisticated new loan strategies reduced both the risk and cost of lending to small business owners. Soon financial giants such as Merrill Lynch and John Han-cock, as well as smaller finance companies like Access Capital, went after the banks’ last domain19 of business borrowers.
(9) The new competitors have succeeded in part because banks have alienated20 so many of their traditional customers. “My experience with banks has been horrible,” says Barry Weinstein, president of Fulton Computer Products in Rockville Centre, New York. “Even if you bank with someone for 25 years, that still doesn’t amount to a hill of beans`.” Sales at Weinstein’s company jumped from $900,000 in 1988 to $18.5 million last year. Yet when Weinstein applied21 for a loan with 12 banks over a period of 24 months, all turned him down, even though he was never late in repaying his previous debts. He eventually borrowed $1 million from Access Capital, a fast-growing finance company based in New York.
(10) Joseph Ricci, who runs a private school in Maine for children with behavioral problems, spent more than two years trying to borrow $700,000 from as many as five banks. But even with $17 million in assets and an unerred credit history, Ricci walked away empty-handed. “We demonstrated to all of them how we could carry the loan. But the banks were just not lending money to business,” he says. Ricci went to a finance company and within six weeks got a loan.
(11) That’s the way the credit crunch22 has brought rapid growth to many nonbank lenders. “There is plenty of demand for financing from small companies,” says Access Capital president Miles Stuchin. “It’s just that the banks are turning them down.” Stuchin set up a finance company in 1986 that Inc. Magazine last year placed in the top 20% of the 500 fastest-growing companies in the U.S.
(12) Perhaps the greatest threat to commercial banks has come from life insurers and pension funds. The two have combined assets of $4.5 trillion, exceeding that of the entire banking industry. They are the largest source of financing for U.S. industry. While bank lending was dropping during the past two years, loans by life insurers jumped $50 billion.
(13) One such loan went to IDB Communications Group, a telecommunications service company based in Culver City, California, whose $78 million line of credit was canceled by a group of banks. “I spent every wak-ing hour for half a year on this issue,” says IDB’s chief financial officer, Ed Cheramy. “It was the worst experi-ence of my life.”
(14) Coming to the rescue with a $20 million loan was Teachers Insurance and Annuity23 Association, the na-tion’s third largest insurance company. In the past year, TIAA has lent a record $3.5 billion to business. Some $225 billion in loans to business are now held by the life-insurance industry, up 11% from two years ago.
(15) Wall Street firms have also cherry-picked some of the banks’ best business. Merrill Lynch, for example, has been targeting smaller companies since the mid-1980s. Last year its business financial-services division had about 3,000 clients and $800 million in loan commitments.
(16) With their loan portfolios24 under fire, banks are in danger of losing their depositors as well. Americans have withdrawn25 more than $500 billion from low-yielding bank accounts over the past three years in favor of higher-paying investments like mutual26 funds. Even the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s $100,000 guarantee is no longer exclusively available to banks and S&Ls. Brokerage firms like Prudential Securities now offer “insured income accounts” with checking privileges and government insurance.
(17) A few banks are vigorously working to recapture their share of business lending. This spring Chemical Bank, the nation’s third largest, kicked off the biggest marketing27 blitz in its history to attract small and me-dium-size business borrowers. An army of 1,800 lending officers, including bank president Walter Shipley and chairman John McGillicuddy, went knocking door to door at 5,000 companies across five states. “Am I con-cerned about Wall Street firms and investment bankers coming into the market? Absolutely,” says Frank Lourenso, who heads Chemical’s midmarket lending division. “They are real players, and I take them very se-riously. But we’re going to be very aggressive in looking for new business.”
(18) That drive was underscored last month when the Federal Reserve gave Chemical the green light to sell and underwrite corporate bonds. Normally banks are barred from such investment-banking activity under the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. But the Fed cited a loophole, and its decision allows certain banks to take on Wall Street directly in wooing business borrowers.
(19) Unshackling the banking sector28 entirely29 from such Depression-era regulatory chains may be the only way to reverse the 20-year structural30 decline of the banks. But that is something the Congress has steadfastly31 refused to do. Nor do such comprehensive reforms appear on President Clinton’s agenda. Yet until such changes are made, banks, once a fixture32 on the U.S. financial landscape, will continue their slow fade.
【参考译文】: 银行过时了吗?
“痴肥且沾沾自喜”的商业银行,其金融媒介的身份正被迅速取代中
(1) 假如美国所有的商业银行突然一起关门,对美国经济造成什么影响?放眼美国大部分的历史,这个答案将是:超大规模的金融灾难,就有如1930年代早期,银行像骨牌效应般连锁倒闭所造成的“大萧条”。但是时至1993年,令人吃惊的答案是:银行倒闭可能无关痛痒。
(2) 想想这件事实:经济复苏已经持续27个月,但在此期间银行对企业新增贷款的净额是零。上周联邦储备委员会报道,全国大银行对企业贷款在6月9日的前一个星期之内又减少了24亿美元成为2748亿美元。在害怕银行信用不足对脆弱的经济造成破坏的情况下,白宫与联邦机构极力促成银行开启它们的贷款窗口。过去两周来,政府当局引用一些新措施,让银行更容易贷款。例如简化贷款的纸上作业,而且所有房地产贷款不再需要正式的估价程序。
(3) 政府的担心有道理吗?现在谁要靠银行?几乎没有。银行曾经独霸企业贷款,但是现在80% 的企业贷款都由非银行机构接管,例如寿险公司、经纪行及融资公司。银行曾是唯一的现款来源,但现在企业与个人可以其保险公司名义开立支票,向退休基金贷款,并把薪水支票存在经纪行的货币市场账户里。华盛顿的银行顾问Edward Furash 指出:“即使银行死光光,我们还是可能拥有蓬勃的经济。”
(4) 具有讽剌意义的是,正在银行加速落入败部的当儿,它们却在过去15个月以来累积了创记录的430亿美元利润,制造出银行业卷土重来的印象。但这些收入并非来自明智的贷款决策。银行没有因贷款给经济复苏的美国而获利,却将它们的基金投资在无风险且提供7% 高利率的政府债券。而这些基金却只提供贡献存款存户2% 的微薄利息。这种投资策略让银行职员无事可做,只须把脚跷在桌上等待利息滚滚涌入。
(5) 这些利润可能是有代价的。银行不只因为紧缩信用而失去许多忠实顾客,而且不经意地敞开大门,让一大批非银行机构蜂拥进入贷款市场。Furash 说:“银行业还没意识到威胁。它们痴肥又沾沾自喜,而且并不了解:现代经济的确需要贷款业,但并不一定需要银行。”
(6) 银行常以孱弱的经济为贷款下降的理由。但是诸多证据显示银行对企业贷款仍是小心翼翼。这并不奇怪。过去5年,银行必须想办法冲销1250亿美元的呆账,这些呆账来自对不动产购买者、发展中国家、农民与能源工业的贷款。
(7) 热衷贷款的其他金融机构大举入侵,对银行造成深切的伤害。戴维"威斯(David Wyss)是大型经济顾问社DRI/McGraw-Hill的资深金融学家。他指出:“银行明显地失去企业贷款的特权。它们应该感到恐惧,因为这才是它们真正的利润所在。”
(8)虽然银行在多年以前就将大型绩优公司拱手让给华尔街的资金市场,但是它们仍旧保留住另一块沃土:中小企业。这种情况在过去数年亦起变化。电脑科技的普及与先进的新贷款策略大幅降低对中小企业贷款的风险与成本。很快的,金融巨人如默林" 林奇(Merrill Lynch) 与约翰" 汉考克(John Hancock)与小型融资公司如Access Capital, 都来抢夺银行最后的一群企业顾客。
(9) 新的竞争者能成功,部分是因为银行疏远了它们传统的顾客。“我与银行来往的经验非常可怕,”Barry Weinstein 是位于纽约州Rockville Centre 的Fulton电脑公司的总经理,他说:“即使你跟银行来往个25年,你们的交情还不如一个屁。”Weinstein的公司营业额自1988年的90万美元跳升到去年的1850万美元,但他花了24个月向12家银行申请贷款。虽然他从来没有拖欠债款的记录,但是所有的银行都拒绝借钱。他最后向纽约的Access Capital, 一家快速成长的融资公司,借了100万美元。
(10) Joesph Ricci 在缅因州开一所教导行为偏差儿童的私立学校,他花了超过两年的时间,向五家银行申贷一笔70万元的款子。即使他有1700万美元的资产以及毫无瑕疵的信用记录,Ricci 仍然两手空空走出银行。他说:“我们跟所有银行说烂了嘴证明我们有能力背负这笔贷款,但是它们就是不贷款给企业。”Ricci 转而找寻融资公司,六周内就借到了钱。
(11) 这就是紧缩信用让非银行机构大发利市的现象。Access Capital 公司总经理Miles Stuchin说:“小企业对贷款的需求很高,只是银行却让它们失望了。”Stuchin 在1986年设立Access Capital, 在去年被《Inc.杂志》列在美国500家成长最快企业的前20% 区间之中。
(12) 商业银行的最大威胁也许是来自寿险公司与退休基金。这两种产业合起来的资产有4.5兆美元,比整个银行业都大。它们是美国产业界最大的金主。过去两年银行贷款下跌,而寿险公司的贷款却跳升了500亿美元。
(13) 其中一笔贷款是调进位在加州Culver City 的IDB 通讯集团,因为银行取消了其7800万美元信用额度。IDB 的财务总经理Ed Cheramy 说:“半年来我无时无刻不在想法子摆平这件事,此及我一生中最恐怖的经验。”
(14) 带着2000万美元来救命的是美国第三大保险公司 Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association。 去年TIAA 贷出空前的35亿美元。目前寿险业的对企业贷款达2250亿美元,比两年前增长11% 。
(15) 华尔街经纪行也挑了几样银行最赚钱的营业项目来经营。例如Merrill Lynch 公司自1980 年代中期起便将目标对准小企业。去年它的企业金融服务部门拥有约3000家顾客,并承诺借出8亿美元。
(16) 不只贷款业务遭到夹攻,银行还有存款流失的危机。过去三年,美国人自低收益的银行户头提出超过5000亿的现款,投入较高收益的投资如共同基金。连联邦存款保险公司的每人10万元存款保险也不再限于仅给与银行和信用合作社。像Prudential Securities 这样的经纪行所提供的“保障收入账户”都有核对优先权与政府保险。
(17) 几家银行已经大张旗鼓地要夺回企业贷款市场。今年春天美国第三大的Chemical 银行以该行空前的大手笔展开一项促销攻势,企图吸引中小企业上门。1800名贷款人员,包括总经理Walter Shipley 与董事长John McGillicuddy, 在五个州逐一拜访5000家企业。Chemical 的中级市场贷款部主管 Frank Lourenso说:“我担心华尔街企业和投资银行来抢市场吗?当然!它们是真正的玩家,而我很严肃地看待它们。但是我们将非常主动地争取新的企业主顾。”
(18) 这样的雄心在上个月得到政府的肯定。联邦储备委员会批准Chemical 银行销售及承销公司债券。通常,根据1933年的Glass Steagall法案,商业银行是不准从事此类投资银行业务的。但是联邦储备理事会引用该法案的漏洞,而它的决定让某些银行可以直接向华尔街挑战,来争取企业主顾。
(19) 让银行自此种大萧条时期订下的枷锁中完全解放出来,也许是让银行业20年来结构性衰退起死回生的唯一方法。但是国会一直坚决反对这样做。这样广泛的改革也未出现在克林顿总统的议事日程中。但是如果不做这些改革,一度在美国金融地图上最显眼的银行业,恐将持续地失去可见度。。
1 akin | |
adj.同族的,类似的 | |
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2 disastrous | |
adj.灾难性的,造成灾害的;极坏的,很糟的 | |
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3 scarcity | |
n.缺乏,不足,萧条 | |
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4 feverishly | |
adv. 兴奋地 | |
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5 appraisals | |
估计,估量,评价( appraisal的名词复数 ) | |
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6 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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7 justified | |
a.正当的,有理的 | |
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8 consultant | |
n.顾问;会诊医师,专科医生 | |
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9 irony | |
n.反语,冷嘲;具有讽刺意味的事,嘲弄 | |
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10 irrelevance | |
n.无关紧要;不相关;不相关的事物 | |
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11 treasury | |
n.宝库;国库,金库;文库 | |
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12 withholding | |
扣缴税款 | |
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13 herd | |
n.兽群,牧群;vt.使集中,把…赶在一起 | |
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14 swarmed | |
密集( swarm的过去式和过去分词 ); 云集; 成群地移动; 蜜蜂或其他飞行昆虫成群地飞来飞去 | |
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15 banking | |
n.银行业,银行学,金融业 | |
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16 abounds | |
v.大量存在,充满,富于( abound的第三人称单数 ) | |
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17 economist | |
n.经济学家,经济专家,节俭的人 | |
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18 corporate | |
adj.共同的,全体的;公司的,企业的 | |
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19 domain | |
n.(活动等)领域,范围;领地,势力范围 | |
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20 alienated | |
adj.感到孤独的,不合群的v.使疏远( alienate的过去式和过去分词 );使不友好;转让;让渡(财产等) | |
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21 applied | |
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22 crunch | |
n.关键时刻;艰难局面;v.发出碎裂声 | |
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23 annuity | |
n.年金;养老金 | |
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24 portfolios | |
n.投资组合( portfolio的名词复数 );(保险)业务量;(公司或机构提供的)系列产品;纸夹 | |
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25 withdrawn | |
vt.收回;使退出;vi.撤退,退出 | |
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26 mutual | |
adj.相互的,彼此的;共同的,共有的 | |
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27 marketing | |
n.行销,在市场的买卖,买东西 | |
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28 sector | |
n.部门,部分;防御地段,防区;扇形 | |
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29 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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30 structural | |
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31 steadfastly | |
adv.踏实地,不变地;岿然;坚定不渝 | |
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32 fixture | |
n.固定设备;预定日期;比赛时间;定期存款 | |
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